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A Certainty of Hopelessness: Adjustments to
Student Exceptionalism in Bankruptcy Law
Jordan Higham1 and Jenica Bunderson2
In 2011, Susan Krieger filed to discharge $30,450 in bankruptcy,
most of which was student debt. In spite of regularly applying for
jobs, residing with her 76-year-old mother, and relying on state welfare to meet her basic needs, Krieger was unable to meet any of
her monthly loan payments.3 While Krieger’s debt was initially discharged, her collection agency, the Education Credit Management
Corporation (ECMC), later appealed the decision to the Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of Illinois. Following an adversary
proceeding, the court reversed the discharge and restored Krieger’s
obligation to pay her outstanding debt.4 The court stated that they
found no evidence that Krieger’s circumstances should necessarily
persist for the foreseeable future, despite the fact that Krieger had
failed to find employment at any of the 180 jobs to which she had
applied. Because only a handful of these applications were outside
her preferred occupation as a paralegal, the court also claimed that
Krieger had made insufficient effort to seek employment outside her
chosen field.5
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While Kreiger went on to successfully challenge the decision
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh circuit
in Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp and restore her discharge,
her extreme difficulty in doing so demonstrates that this case is
the exception that proves the rule of student exceptionalism. Student exceptionalism refers to the long-standing doctrine that in
bankruptcy, student debt should only be dischargeable in extraordinary circumstances. This doctrine is so universal that even the
most desperate students rarely attempt to escape their debt through
bankruptcy.6 A 2015 study by the Federal Reserve estimated that out
of 884,956 annual bankruptcy cases, only 674 sought to discharge
student debt, most of which failed.7 Even when student debtors are
facing life circumstances as bleak as Krieger’s—circumstances
which would certainly warrant the discharge of ordinary debt—they
are generally not entitled to debt relief. And despite the ubiquity of
student exceptionalism, there is still some variation in how different courts interpret the criteria under which debtors qualify for the
rare, exceptional discharge.8 While federal laws and precedent create
universal standards that guide courts’ rulings, there remains a great
deal of ambiguity within these standards, which leads to an inconsistent application of bankruptcy law. More importantly, this ambiguity
often leads to courts enforcing standards that are much stricter than
the letter of bankruptcy law, resulting in a harsh brand of student
exceptionalism that many judges and scholars refer to as “a certainty
of hopelessness.”9
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In this paper, we explore the history of bankruptcy law and the
trends which have made it so difficult for debtors to discharge student
loans in bankruptcy. We will introduce the concept of undue hardship and the Brunner test, a standard created in 1987 which gives
courts three criteria for determining whether repaying a student loan
constitutes undue hardship.10 To demonstrate the application and
ambiguity of these criteria, we examine several prominent court rulings that reveal an excessively strict standard for allowing discharge.
We will then propose specific metrics to add to the Brunner test to
give courts a clear idea of what qualifies as undue hardship and,
under such qualifications, allows a person to discharge student debt.

I. Background
A. Establishment of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
The current hurdles faced by Americans attempting to discharge
their student debt begin with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Before § 523(a)
(8)’s creation in 1978, discharging student loans in bankruptcy was
an almost identical process to discharging any other debt. During
this time, however, many lawmakers and policy experts began to
worry about the longevity of the federal student loan program, for
two reasons: 1) Unlike most loans, lenders cannot take out collateral
on student loans. Debt collecting agencies can seize a person’s property if they fail to pay a mortgage, but failure to pay student debt
cannot result in one’s education or degree being taken away. 2) The
federal government does not risk rate debtors, meaning that anyone
is eligible for a loan regardless of credit history or financial trustworthiness.11 These two factors make it possible for a critical mass
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of people to take out loans that they do not have the ability to repay,
jeopardizing the entire program.12
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) was a response to these concerns. In its
infancy, § 523(a)(8) excepted students from discharge during the first
five years of repayment, implying that a longer time period from
graduation was necessary to prove that the debtor had attempted to
repay the loan without resorting to bankruptcy.13 In the decades following, the bankruptcy code for student loan discharge has grown
increasingly stringent. In 1990, the minimum waiting period for discharge was increased from 5 to 7 years,14 and in 1998, lawmakers
removed the option to discharge after a waiting period altogether,
opting instead to rely solely on its “undue hardship” requirement.15
B. Undue Hardship
Undue hardship describes the circumstances under which a person
is exempted from the obligation to repay student debt, due to the
extreme and undeserved strain that the obligation would place on the
debtor. This standard is inarguably vague. Amendments to § 523(a)
(8) and later legislation do not provide a precise or implementable
definition of undue hardship, and congressional records of the discussion surrounding these pieces of legislation do not resolve this issue.16
The task of interpreting undue hardship therefore fell to the
courts. It was not until 1987 that a somewhat universal standard of
undue hardship came in the form of the Brunner test, a three-pronged
approach to determining the impact of student debt on debtors. The
Brunner test arose from the 1987 student loan bankruptcy case
Marie Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp,
12
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in which the court determined that a more explicit test was necessary
to prove undue hardship. The Brunner test describes three requirements under which a debtor qualifies for discharge: 1) The debtor
is not able to maintain a basic standard of living while repaying the
loans; 2) Circumstances exist that strongly indicate that this state of
affairs will continue for the majority of the repayment period; 3) The
debtor has made good faith attempts to repay the loan.17
C. Application of Brunner
Despite these three requirements, the Brunner test’s ability to ensure
that good-faith debtors receive relief from financial hardship is questionable. Historically, bankruptcy courts have interpreted the Brunner test and ruled on student loan cases in a way that goes beyond
its original language, as demonstrated in Krieger. Exceptions to this
excessively strict application of Brunner rarely survive appeals to
higher courts. For example, in 1993, a bankruptcy court departed
from standard procedure and granted Francisco Espinosa discharge
of the accrued interest on a student loan, requiring him to only pay
the principal debt of $13,250 without making a finding of undue
hardship or holding an adversary proceeding with the loan servicer.
Espinosa paid off the principal on the debt in 1997, but in 2000,
Espinosa’s loan servicer, United Student Aid Funds, Inc., came to
collect interest on the loan.18 A district court ruled that United was
denied due process in the original case because no adversary proceeding was held, reversing the lower court’s decision. Espinosa
then appealed his case to the Supreme Court, which opened his case
in 2009.
The Supreme Court ruled that the original bankruptcy court’s
discharge of the debt had been erroneous, maintaining that for discharge, an adversary proceeding must have been held and the debtor
must have provided proof of undue hardship. The Court also ruled
that since United waited seven years to challenge the bankruptcy
17
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court’s ruling, they could not expect Espinosa to pay the remainder of the debt.19 While the debt remained discharged, the Supreme
Court’s ruling against the lower court’s original decision further
cemented the ubiquity of student exceptionalism and high standards
for discharge eligibility.
Since that time, other court rulings have indicated that this stringent interpretation is subject to change, most clearly demonstrated
by a 2020 ruling in Rosenberg v. New York State Higher Education
Services. In 2018, Kevin Rosenberg filed for bankruptcy, attempting to discharge over $220,000 of student debt that he accumulated
while attending law school. Having chosen to practice law only
briefly upon graduation, he had no means to repay such a large
sum. In this case, the court still used the Brunner test to evaluate
Rosenberg’s debt, but with more leniency than is typical, and his
debt was discharged in full.20 In a court opinion, Judge Cecelia Morris explained that the court did not require Rosenberg to provide
evidence that his inability to repay the debt would “persist forever,”
as has often been required of debtors. Additionally, the court did not
determine whether Rosenberg’s state of affairs was a consequence
of choice.21 Typically, in a case such as this, Rosenberg would have
had to account for the fact that he only practiced law very briefly
after graduation, as a typical legal salary would have been sufficient
to save him from his dire financial straits. The good faith prong of
the Brunner test would be satisfied only if Rosenberg’s departure
from practicing law was reasonably outside his control. Judge Morris pointed out that this requirement, while a common application
of Brunner, is found nowhere in the wording of the Brunner test or
in § 523(a)(8). In her concluding remarks, Judge Morris states that
“The harsh results that often are associated with Brunner are actually the result of cases interpreting Brunner. Over the past 32 years,
many cases have pinned on Brunner punitive standards that are not
contained therein… They have become a quasi-standard of mythic
19
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proportions so much so that most people (bankruptcy professionals
as well as lay individuals) believe it impossible to discharge student
loans.”22 These statements, along with this court’s lenient application
of Brunner, demonstrate how courts have created a harsh precedent
that goes against the original language and principles of bankruptcy
law. The subjective nature of Brunner allows for a concerningly
large variety of interpretation; thus, the addition of an objective or
quantitative metric to the Brunner test could have beneficial effects
on courts that use it to determine the existence of undue hardship.

II. Adjusting Brunner And 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
Current application of § 523(a)(8) and the Brunner test reveal that
there are three basic issues with how the federal court system handles
student debt. The first issue is that the standard for what constitutes
undue hardship is too high, barring many debtors from a deserved
discharge. The second issue is that courts inconsistently apply the
Brunner test across federal jurisdictions and between higher and
lower courts. The third issue is that the burden of proof placed on
the debtor in establishing that they meet the three prongs of Brunner
is unreasonably high. Introducing new metrics to evaluate a debtor’s
situation based on these issues will better ensure that courts treat
debtors fairly and that consistent standards are applied to all cases.
A. Living Wage
To address the first two issues, we propose amending § 523(a)(8) to
resolve the ambiguity of Brunner’s first prong, that the debtor cannot
maintain a basic standard of living. These adjustments would include
a more concrete method of evaluation in determining undue hardship. We propose that the standard of living criterion be determined
by a simple threshold of a living wage. If giving up 10% of monthly
income to pay off student loans would place debtors under the living wage threshold, their circumstances should satisfy the hardship
prong of Brunner and qualify them for discharge of student loans,
22

See id. at 459.
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provided the other prongs are also satisfied. Using a universally
applicable metric such as living wage removes ambiguity, which historically has resulted in an unreasonably high standard applied to
debtors, as seen in cases such as in Espinosa.
Currently, courts evaluate debtors’ finances to determine if they
are responsibly living within their means and if they can maintain
a satisfactory standard of living. Under this practice, there is some
variation between different courts on the strictness with which they
evaluate debtors’ finances.23 Our proposed standard would create
an equal and more lenient standard for everyone, better ensuring
that debtors receive necessary relief. It should also be noted that the
requirement to subtract 10% of monthly income to fall under the
threshold comes from current options available to debtors to refinance their loans. Several federal relief programs exist for student
loans in which debtors can have a portion of their wages (usually
10%) allocated to paying off student debt for a certain period (usually 25 years). After this time, the remainder of the debt is forgiven.24
The living wage threshold we propose targets those whose financial
hardship is dire enough that they cannot afford to give up even 10%
of income for a prolonged period.
Finding where to draw the living wage threshold is difficult. We
maintain that the guiding principle of any solution should be balancing fairness between debtor and creditor. Thus, any threshold worth
implementing must provide relief to more debtors than is possible
under the current system, while also ensuring that the federal student loan program does not come under risk of bankruptcy, per the
original rationale behind § 523(a)(8). We submit that the best existing
candidate for a specific threshold comes from a method of calculating area-specific living expenses developed by economists at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These researchers compiled
data from every county and metropolitan area in the United States
23
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and determined living expenses based on local prices of necessities.
Their calculation also includes other variable factors such as household size and the income of one’s spouse or partner. The researchers’ criteria for what constitutes a “livable’’ income is that which is
required to be financially independent, or to have basic needs met
without additional government or community assistance. A livable
income includes the ability to pay expenses for housing, transportation, food, childcare, basic healthcare, and taxes. It does not include
expenses such as entertainment, eating out, or savings. As economists designed this standard to be the minimum income required
to live without assistance and, as such, cuts out all nonessential
expenses, this living wage threshold is analogous to the lowest bar
of what can reasonably be considered a threshold for hardship.25 In
other words, if a debtor cannot maintain a living wage while paying
off the loan, undue hardship is certainly implied. We therefore assert
that any system that explicitly or implicitly creates a harsher standard to meet the undue hardship requirement of § 523(a)(8) violates
even the most textual interpretation of this law.
We recognize that extenuating circumstances may exist in which
a person may not fall below the living wage threshold but still be living in undue hardship. In the proposed § 523(a)(8) alterations, falling
below the living wage line would be a sufficient, not a necessary,
condition for discharge. Most exceptions would likely arise from
medical conditions for which the normal calculation of healthcare
costs is insufficient. In this case, adding the additional healthcare
costs to the standard living wage line would be sufficient. In other
extenuating circumstances, a debtor could contest their hardship
before a bankruptcy court. As these cases are exceptional by nature,
we make no proposals for how courts should handle them.
The MIT living wage metric was designed by experts to draw
the line at the threshold of what is livable, and, according to many
economists, it is the single best system to determine who lives in
hardship. This metric fits neatly within the current legal framework,
25
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staying true to the original rationale of student exceptionalism while
also fulfilling the classical doctrine of U.S. bankruptcy law, which
holds that “the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’ has a right to bankruptcy’s ‘fresh start.’”26 We do not claim that a living wage threshold
is the only necessary measure to fix the student debt crisis. While
major reforms to the federal bankruptcy programs may be in order,
our primary focus is ensuring that the current body of legislation and
precedent accomplishes its stated intentions: in this case, by providing relief to those living in undue hardship.
B. Persistence and Good Faith
The living wage threshold is a necessary tool in determining hardship, but this is only one part of the equation. The other two prongs
of Brunner provide a framework for determining if the debtor’s hardship is undue and persistent, requiring the debtor to demonstrate that
his or her state of affairs will continue for the foreseeable future and
that he or she has made good faith efforts to repay the loan. As we
have discussed previously, the court opinion issued by Judge Morris
in Rosenberg shows the contrast between the text of the law itself
and the extra criteria courts have applied to these tests. For Brunner’s
“persistence of circumstances” prong, Judge Morris points out that
most courts place such a high burden of proof on the debtor that he
or she effectively has to demonstrate that his or her financial straits
will “endure forever.” The actual text of this prong of the Brunner
test, from the official court opinion issued in Marie Brunner v. New
York State Higher Education Services Corp., states that it must be
the case that “additional circumstances exist indicating that this state
of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period of the student loans.”27 What constitutes “likely to persist” is
open to interpretation, but there is little doubt that the standard, as
applied in the cases we have explained above and in countless other
unmentioned lesser-known cases, typically goes beyond reasonable
26
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likelihood. Our recommendation is to include a clause in § 523(a)(8)
that satisfies this criterion if a debtor has been living below the living
wage for a majority of a three-year period, which is the upper limit
for how long a debtor can put federal student loans in forbearance
and pause repayments. As with the living wage requirement itself,
there are many scenarios in which a sudden change in circumstances
could cause a person’s financial situation to be new yet permanent, in
which case he or she would be able to contest that courts waive this
three-year requirement.
Brunner’s third prong is that the debtor has made a good faith
effort to repay their student debt. We have no official proposal for
amendments based on this prong; however, we reiterate that as is
the case with prongs one and two, courts have long been, in the
words of Judge Morris, adding “punitive standards that are not contained [in § 523(a)(8) or Brunner].”28 The most notable departure that
Rosenberg took from these extra standards, as we have described in
the previous section, is that the court did not require Rosenberg to
demonstrate that his financial situation was not the foreseeable consequence of his actions. Rosenberg, as well as Krieger, both could
potentially have prevented some of their hardship had they pursued
different occupations. This is one aspect in which Judge Morris’ ruling may have gone too far; while not explicitly stated in statutory
bankruptcy law, occupation of choice is naturally a logical consideration for assessing effort made in good faith. Were chosen occupation not grounds for courts denying a discharge, it would be possible
and perhaps inevitable for students to accumulate massive debt that
they had no intention of repaying, safe in the knowledge that their
financial status and frequency of repayments would be sufficient to
qualify them as a good-faith debtor in undue hardship. Going forward, courts should continue to consider chosen occupations, but in
the context of other factors in the debtor’s situation. In other words,
choosing a lower paying profession should not automatically be
grounds for disqualifying for discharge. Overall, due to the highly
circumstantial nature of assessing “good faith,” we recommend that
this prong remain subject to the court’s interpretation, but with a
28

See Rosenberg, at 459.

70

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 35, 2021

primary focus on the debtor’s frequency and total value of repayments relative to his or her financial status.
C. Implementation and Caveats
It is important to note that while the proposed living wage provides
a precisely calculated, location-specific metric for the minimum
amount necessary to meet basic needs, it is not yet codified into
the US legal system. The federal minimum wage, which is legally
defined, has been insufficient for maintaining living expenses since
the 1960’s.29 Likewise, the legally recognized poverty line is far
lower than any reasonable interpretation of hardship, as noted by
the economists that developed the living wage metric. We therefore recognize that our proposal to incorporate the living wage into
bankruptcy courts’ decisions regarding the proof of undue hardship
faces substantial legal hurdles: while proponents of a legally codified
living wage have lobbied the federal government for decades, the
minimum wage and poverty line currently remain the only legally
recognized minimum standards of living.
The adoption of the living wage as a consideration during bankruptcy proceedings remains a viable option for courts, which are
allowed more discretion and flexibility as they examine circumstances on a case-by-case basis. We do not suggest that the addition
of a living wage requirement into the Brunner test should diminish courts’ ability to freely interpret individual situations: rather,
we believe that such an added metric will allow the Brunner test
to be interpreted as originally intended, since those who fall below
the living wage are, in most cases, undoubtedly living in hardship.
Additionally, our proposal for a three-year time period clause gives
courts yet another specific metric to understand if the debtor’s situation is a long-term one and thereby judge their situation fairly and
accurately. Given such aids, we believe that the courts will be able to
perform the Brunner test and assess undue hardship accurately and
as originally intended, assuaging the important concerns addressed
29
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in Rosenberg and allowing for more consistency in court rulings
regarding student loan bankruptcy.

III. Conclusion
Once again, we are not arguing for sweeping reforms to the federal student loan program, nor are we necessarily arguing against it.
However, given the current difficulty of discharging student debt in
bankruptcy, and within the context of current bankruptcy law and
doctrine, we maintain that steps must be taken to ensure that the
application of law more closely matches the law’s intention. These
proposals seek to balance principles of fairness between debtor and
creditor. One the one hand, it is a tenet of U.S. bankruptcy doctrine
that the “honest but unfortunate debtor” has a right to a fresh start
through bankruptcy, and courts should seek to achieve this goal for
student debtors as much as possible. On the other hand, the economic demands on the federal student loan program and the nature
of student loans make realizing this goal unrealistic. Student loans,
as we discussed, have no collateral. Universities and creditors cannot
demand that debtors return an academic degree or years of education
if financial obligations aren’t met: thus, there is no way to enforce
payment. High default rates—and there is every incentive to default
on a loan with no collateral, even among those that began with honest intentions—would place any federal student loan program under
constant threat of bankruptcy.
Student exceptionalism in bankruptcy was therefore a necessary step in saving the federal student loan program. But the heavyhanded application of law has swung the pendulum too far in the
other direction. Forty-five million American students and graduates
collectively hold $1.7 trillion of student debt, a figure that amounts to
almost 8% of U.S. GDP.30 Current bankruptcy law may have saved
the student loan program from bankruptcy, but it has also contributed to soaring tuition prices, created a growing debt bubble, and
30
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placed inescapable hardship on the backs of millions. Economists
disagree on the long-term impact of these policies, but even the most
optimistic concede that this is a problem with which citizens and
lawmakers will grapple for at least a generation.31 The proposals we
have set forth address a small but crucial part of the student debt
crisis. Millions of student debtors qualify for bankruptcy even under
the standards of § 523(a)(8) and the Brunner test. Most of those that
have filed for bankruptcy have nonetheless failed, because, to paraphrase Judge Morris of the Southern District of New York, most
courts have applied standards that are not contained in law. It is time
for a course correction.
The most important part of these adjustments is giving the law
a more precise and equal tool for determining who lives in hardship,
a need that we answer through the calculation of living wage. There
is then the secondary but still vital issue of determining if a hardship is undue and persistent. We suggest that courts should, in most
situations, make this decision based on a simple evaluation of past
income and frequency of repayments. There will be exceptions to
the rules we have laid out, some of which we have accounted for, but
the rest we place in the hands of courts. We regard these proposals
as being a tune-up, a refinement of an existing process, rather than a
new system altogether. There may be a need for grander policies to
address the debt crisis in the future, but we offer these suggestions as
a possible first step. Even if amendments to § 523(a)(8) and a reinterpretation of Brunner do not go very far in solving a national crisis, it
is our hope that these adjustments may save a few from the crushing
weight of debt and give a fresh start to those that most deserve it.
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